Arab states of uncertainty

Revolutions in Middle East have revealed fragility of the region
Posted: January 9, 2013

By Shlomo Ben-Ami

The revolutions that swept the Arab world during the past two years have exposed the extraordinary fragility of key Arab states. With the exception of historical countries such as Egypt or Morocco, most Arab states are artificial constructs of European colonialism that combined disparate tribes and ethnicities into unitary states that could be held together only by authoritarian rule and a common enemy – Zionism and its Western patrons.

Today’s turmoil, however, is no longer driven by anger at foreign forces; instead, it marks a second phase of the de-colonization process: the assertion of the right of self-determination by peoples and tribes united only by a dictator’s yoke. Indeed, it is not entirely farfetched to anticipate the emergence of new Arab states from the debris of the old, artificial ones. The American invasion of Iraq set the pattern, for it broke the central government’s power and empowered ethnic and religious enclaves.

What happened in Yugoslavia, an ill-conceived product of Wilsonian diplomacy, could happen in the more cynical imperial creations in the Middle East. What Sigmund Freud defined as “the narcissism of minor differences” caused Yugoslavia to split into seven small states (including Kosovo), following the bloodiest fighting in Europe since World War II. Can the Arab states avoid a similar fate?

Democratization in the Arab world is not only about toppling dictators; it is also about redressing the politico-ethnic map of the region, which has kept too many minority groups dissatisfied. Consider the Kurds, who were split among Iraq, Turkey, Syria and Iran.

But the Kurds are hardly alone. Libya was created out of three former Italian colonies, Tripolitania, Cyrenaica and Fezzan, each essentially comprising different tribal confederations (the Saff al-Bahar in Tripolitania, the Sa’adi in Cyrenaica and the Tuareg in Fezzan). The fall of Muammar el-Qaddafi opened a Pandora’s box of old rivalries, with Cyrenaica developing into a semi-autonomous region known as Barqa.

Likewise, long-standing tensions between Bahrain’s ruling Sunni minority and Shia majority have worsened since the country’s Shia-led pro-democracy movement was crushed in 2011. As for Jordan, the precarious balance between the Palestinian majority and the Bedouin minority was difficult enough to maintain in stable times; it is a far more precarious undertaking now.

Other states in the region have been teetering on the brink of failure from the outset. Yemen emerged in 1990 from the reunification of South Yemen and North Yemen, which fought bitter wars in 1972 and 1979. But its leaders have never been able to integrate the tribes, the primary units of Yemen’s social structure, into the political system in a manner that generates their unequivocal acceptance of the sovereign state.

Syria powerfully demonstrates how a fight against a dictator can soon turn into a sectarian struggle for survival or mastery. Notwithstanding the worldwide legitimacy now enjoyed by the National Coalition of Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces, a disorderly collapse of the regime might yet lead to the country’s division into autonomous ethnic enclaves. The rebels, mostly Sunnis assisted by jihadi groups such as the Nusra Front, an offshoot of al-Qaida in Iraq, have never truly attempted to reach out to the country’s minorities – Christians, Shia, Druze and Kurds – which have repudiated the National Coalition as being “obedient to Turkey and Qatar.”

The Kurds, under the yoke of Arabs, Turks and Iranians, saw in the demise of Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq – and now see in the dismemberment of other Arab autocracies – an opportunity to join the new Great Middle Eastern Game. That means realizing the dream of uniting their dispersed nation in an independent Kurdish state.

The Kurdish militias in north Syria, which sought to stay out of the civil war while preparing their own autonomous enclave should Bashar al-Assad’s regime be toppled, are now being drawn into the fighting; the Iraqi Kurds, who have been training their Syrian kin, may well follow. Turkey inevitably views Kurdish activism in northern Syria – led by the Democratic Union party, an offshoot of the insurgent Kurdistan Workers Party in Turkey – as a direct threat to its stability, and will do its utmost to prevent it from sparking rebellion among Turkey’s own restive Kurdish minority.

Lebanon is yet another ethnic tapestry that cannot be immune to events in Syria. Already, signs of spillover effects can be seen in clashes between Sunni and Alawite militias. However hegemonic Hezbollah may now seem, its power in Lebanon depends heavily on the support of the Assad regime. Should Assad fall, and the Sunni-led opposition rise to power, the ensuing balance of power in Syria is bound to reshape the balance of power in Lebanon.

Might South Sudan, the mostly Christian state that seceded in 2011 from the Muslim Arab North after a long civil war, become the new paradigm for nonhistorical Arab states riven by ethnic and tribal rivalries? As former Premier of China Zhou Enlai supposedly said of the impact of the French Revolution, “It is too early to tell.” But there can be no doubt that the post-colonial status quo in the Middle East is crumbling. A multifaceted region has yet to crystallize into more definitive political constructions.

-Shlomo Ben-Ami, a former Israeli foreign minister and the vice president of the Toledo International Center for Peace, is the author of Scars of War, Wounds of Peace: The Israeli-Arab Tragedy.

© Project Syndicate 2013

http://www.praguepost.com © The Prague Post 2013

A new role for Morocco in North Africa?

By Benjamin P. Nickels
The Arab Spring’s echoes in sub-Saharan Africa are more complex than initially imagined. For example, much has been made of how Libya’s crisis has led to Mali’s crisis, but rather less has been said about how the transitions in North Africa may set the stage for new forms of security cooperation in the Sahel. Such possibilities are quietly taking shape now, even as the world struggles to find a multilateral response to developments in northern Mali. A prime example is the January 2013 meeting of the Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD) in N’djamena, Chad, where Morocco will likely continue its steps to take command of the body. CEN-SAD was set adrift by the Arab Spring, which unmoored the African Peace and Security Architecture and shook the African Union by removing its key supporter, Moammar Gadhafi. The least known of the AU’s eight regional economic communities, the Community of Sahel-Saharan States proffered lofty and increasingly improbable visions of economic union and political and cultural exchange for an ever-growing swath of the continent; it mushroomed from six to 28 members over 13 years through Libyan largesse. By late 2011, however, the organization looked likely to fade along with the death of Libya’s dictator.

Meanwhile, the Arab Spring opened up new partnership opportunities for Morocco, Africa’s only non-AU member country, which has been long isolated by the Western Sahara conflict and its rivalry with neighboring Algeria. With the polarizing personalities of Gadhafi and Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali gone, there may be glimmers of a new hope for one of the African Peace and Security Architecture’s most troubled northern regional economic communities: the Arab Maghreb Union, whose revival Tunisia looks set to push forward. Also about a year ago, African states began lobbying Morocco to revitalize CEN-SAD.

Of these alliances, CEN-SAD must be particularly attractive to Morocco, for several reasons. Its preeminence in the organization will likely go uncontested; no other member has the spur, stature and stability to lead it. Other potential leaders (Nigeria and Kenya) are firmly ensconced as anchor states in existing, functional regional economic communities – Nigeria in the Economic Community of West African States and Kenya in the East African Community, among others. Egypt remains deeply embroiled in regional diplomacy and its own internal affairs, and Algeria’s absence from CEN-SAD should allow Morocco free rein to guide the organization independent of its neighbor.

Moreover, the kingdom may enjoy novel forms of influence within a regional economic community based on a projection of Africa’s Arab and Muslim north into the continent’s south; CEN-SAD apparently an abbreviation taken from Arabic letters sin and sad (for Al-Sahel and Al-Sahara), covers over half of Africa’s nations, and what unites such a diverse set of countries – from Gambia to the Comoros, and Somalia to Sierra Leone – more than any connection to ecoclimatic or environmental conditions, is Islam. With the exception of Algeria, CEN-SAD is the regional economic community of all Muslim-majority African states (as well as member states with significant Muslim minorities) – convenient for a king whose authority rests in part on his position as “Commander of the Faithful.”

More importantly, however, leadership of CEN-SAD would allow Rabat to engage in a region where it has deep and direct security concerns. Moroccan officials regularly reference the south and southeast as major sources of concern, especially for rising transnational threats. The bordering Sahel is a zone of illegal immigration; of illicit trafficking in weapons, arms and people; and of operation and sanctuary for Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and a proliferating set of armed groups. These challenges are clearly costing Morocco; as more illegal migrants settle in the country, more trafficking corrupts Saharawi youth and more Islamist terrorist attacks threaten metropolitan centers and tourist hubs.

While weathering the Arab Spring, the Moroccan government adopted a new constitution in July 2011 that restates Morocco’s foreign policy priorities, with notable prominence given to sub-Saharan Africa. The Sahel is explicitly highlighted, and it follows only the Maghreb and the umma (and precedes the Mediterranean world) in the document’s listing of Morocco’s regional priorities. For all of these reasons, the country has an interest in adopting and adapting the ready-made structure of CEN-SAD – an organization with a history not only of economic interaction and cultural exchange, but of deployment of multi-national forces for peacekeeping operations (as it did in 2001 with the Central African Republic).

Last June, Rabat took the first step: hosting a CEN-SAD meeting aimed at revitalizing the organization and shifting its focus toward security. The upcoming N’djamena meeting should provide further insight into Morocco’s intentions and CEN-SAD’s prospects and direction. Key indicators to watch include responsibilities and authorities delegated to CEN-SAD’s new peace and security committee; financial commitments made to CEN-SAD by member states, particularly Morocco; proposals to locate any CEN-SAD organs outside of Tripoli, Libya (where the organization is presently housed); the role taken by weighty members, such as Egypt, Senegal, Nigeria and Kenya; and the emphasis placed on security questions in CEN-SAD’s west (such as Mali and Nigeria) rather than its east (such as Somalia and Sudan-South Sudan).

Last month in N’djamena, Chadian government officials described a scenario in which peripheral nations peel away, no longer drawn to the table by Gadhafi’s carrots (or sticks), and CEN-SAD tightens to a 10-country community focused exclusively on the regional economic communities west. This would prime the organization for action in places like northern Mali. Finally, beyond the meeting itself, any reaction from Algeria regarding a Moroccan-led CEN-SAD reboot will have major implications. A particularly interesting and thorny situation for Morocco would be Algeria’s application for membership.

The January 2013 summit under Chad’s presidency will mark an advance, but CEN-SAD will remain hard pressed to make any quick-fuse intervention in the Mali crisis. Nonetheless, this improbable regional economic community may eventually find itself engaged there and in the Sahel more broadly – whether in the current crisis or another down the road.

The Arab Spring’s reverberations are full of contradictions and ironies. It may be that CEN-SAD’s founder had to die for the organization to live, and that the regional economic community’s anchor state will shift from one of the AU’s strongest advocates, Libya, to its only nonmember, Morocco. The straight line from the Libya crisis to the Mali crisis is rather clear, but the ultimate meaning of the Arab Spring for peace and security in Africa remains to be seen.

Benjamin P. Nickels is an assistant professor of transnational threats and counterterrorism at the Africa Center for Strategic Studies. This commentary first appeared at Sada, an online journal from the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

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11/01/2013